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TEAM PROPOSAL
The German Federal Office of Defense Technology and 
Procurement, has been analyzing the influence of networked 
sensors and effectors on military capabilities. Background 
for the actual technical evaluations of sensors, effectors and 
the connecting network is the scenario vignette: Convoy 
Protection as part of an over all scenario PSO in an urban 
environment. 
The convoy transports fuel, ammunition and food in an 
urban environment and is protected and supported by:
• Two check points as flank protections
• UAV, UGV
• 4 AWC (Wiesel)
• 3 LIV (Fuchs) 
Evaluation of the Ground Picture
There is an asymmetric threat: A local burning obstacle 
brings the convoy to a stop. Mobile barriers are used in an 
ambush, with snipers and bazooka shots that are looking for 
an opportunity to intercept the convoy. 
The convoy leader can react on information from UAV 
and UGV on possible trafficability of the pre planned route. 
Detours are possible.
The MOÉs are:
• RED casualties and
• BLUE casualties. 
The technical effects of special sensors and effectors at the 
convoy and his NCO capability are examined. Variations are 
investigated in the technical representation of UAV / UGV 
speeds, communication and sensors, in scenario details and 
in a variation of protection and equipment and these will be 
interpreted in the following three step approach:
1. using existing equipment (sensors, effectors),
2. using equipment under development (sensors, 
effectors),
3. using future equipment (sensors, effectors). 
Results
The basic implementation of the scenario in MANA is 
challenging because of the high level of detail and clearly 
we reach the limitations of the tool MANA. Especially the 
implementation of the convoy as a sequence of vehicles was 
really time consuming. In defining the “working point” of 
the scenario in various cases secondary and third order 
effects in MANA lead to completely unpredictable model 
behavior.
Sequentially, in 5 Data Farming activities on the 128 / 32 
node clusters at EADS, we found a parameter set 
corresponding to our question base. 
We continued the work of PAIW12 where we looked at 
16 parameters: Convoy Speed, Hit-probability and Combat 
Distance of Fighting Vehicles, UAV / UGV Speed, UAV / 
UGV Sensor Range, UAV / UGV Classification Probability, 
Network Reliability, Network Accuracy, Bazooka Range, 
Bazooka Hit-probability, Bazooka Reaction Time, Rifle 
Range, Rifle Hit-probability, Rifle Maximum Number of 
Targets per Timestep.
Unfortunately the results were almost all equal to zero. 
That means no casualties on the blue side happened.
With our interpretations of the datafarming results from 
PAIW12, we saw that we did not appropriately appreciate 
the cumulative effect of the UAV’s and UGV’s detection 
probability ((per time-step). Furthermore we saw that with 
the selected ranges for the weapon factors we gave a certain 
disadvantage to the red side. Therefore we studied with our 
first investigations on IDFW13, the effect of the following 
factors:
• UGV’s detection probability
• Rifle’s hit probability
• Rifle’s maximum number of targets per time-step
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• Bazooka’s hit probability
• AWC/LIV’s hit probability
We found that the rifle’s maximum number of targets 
per time-step is the most import factor (it already explains 
70 % of the responses by itself). The following factors are as 
expected: the UGV’s detection probability and the rifle’s hit 
probability.
At the same time we had to observe that there were no 
casualties on the red side. We could explain this by the 
stealth factor of the red agents. Casualties only appeared 
when it was smaller than 95 %. This confirms a  result we 
got during the revision of PAIW12.
Here we studied the probability of  casualties of the 
second tanker by a gridded design for the factors stealth and 
UGV’s detection probability. In the direction of the stealth 
factor there is a discontinuity in the surface and it is constant 
on the two branches. This behavior is strange and 
contradicts the results of a simple experiment we made with 
the default scenario of MANA where we added a terrain 
with the same attributes.
We made a thousand replications for each level of the 
stealth factor of the blue agent. The left part of the diagram 
shows the casualties of both agents with the terrain attribute 
concealment = 0.9 and cover = 0. For the right part the cover 
attribute was increased to 0.8. Obviously the curves are not 
constant. 
This fact should be discussed with the developers of 
MANA.
To go on with our investigations we found a reasonable 
and practical workaround. By adding the “shot-at” - trigger 
state the blue escort can’t open fire but return fire. And with 
the “taken shot” - trigger state the red side reduces the 
stealth factor from 95 % to 90 % when opening fire.
With these modifications and some changes in the 
design we carried out the data farming. In comparison to 
the design of PAIW12, besides some changes of ranges, we 
removed the concealment factor on the red side and added 
the hit-probability of the escort and the maximum number 
of target per timestep of the rifles. Instead of the 16 factors 
we had 17, and so we had to switch to the bigger NOLH - 
design with 129 excursions.
Again we worked with a hundred replications. Looking at 
the results we were especially interested in:
• the probability that the convoy takes the original route 
(to study the effects of the sensor and network 
parameters) =: MOE1
• the kill-probability of the first truck (food) (to study the 
effects of the escort parameters) =: MOE2
• the kill-probability of the last truck (gas) (to study the 
effects of the escort parameters) =: MOE3
The regression tree for the probability that the convoy 
takes the original route (MOE1) shows that in the following 
order the network accuracy, the network reliability, the 
UGV’s sensor range, the UGV’s speed and the UAV’s sensor 
range are the most important factors.
For example the following picture shows MOE1 
depending on network accuracy and reliability.
It shows the expected behavior that with low accuracy 
and reliability of the network the convoy leader doesn’t get 
the information to stay on the original route.
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In contrast to the results of PAIW12 the next picture 
shows the distributions of the kill-probabilities of the trucks 
which obviously are not equal to zero.
So we could go on with first analysis. The regression 
tree neglecting the sensor and network parameters showed 
that the rifle’s maximum number of targets per timestep and 
it’s hit-probability followed by the hit-probability of the 
escort are the most important factors as far as MOE2 and 
MOE3 are concerned.
The upper regression tree for MOE3 was built taking all 
factors into account. It shows that for MOE3 the weapon 
parameters are more important than the sensor and network 
parameters.
By a regression model we studied interactions between 
factors. The model that explains the results to 75 % came up 
with some minor interactions :
The workshop ended with a convoy scenario that worked 
fairly well. There are still open questions:
• Why wasn’t there an action of the bazooka?
• Why was the bazooka not killed?
• How will the results change depending on the behavior 
on the red side?
• What are the effects of the sensors of the escort (without 
UGV an UAV)?
• What will be the effect of a mine road block?
• Can the upper questions be answered by MANA?
Above all we have to have a closer look at the results of 
the datafarming session at IDFW13!
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